The Day Chungcheong Becomes the Center of Korea: Will Heo Tae-jung's Megacity Vision Become Reality?

Have you ever thought about Daejeon, Sejong, South Chungcheong, and North Chungcheong together? In most cases, we consume news and policies from each region separately, so the idea that they should move as one organic economic zone rarely comes to mind. Overshadowed by the capital region's powerful centrality, Chungcheong has long been viewed only as the 'backyard of the capital region' or a 'transit area.' Heo Tae-jung, the Democratic Party candidate for Daejeon Mayor running in the 2026 local elections, calls for a shift in this perception. This article examines Heo's vision for a Chungcheong megacity and its realistic limitations, based on the policy analysis experience of Shim Jae-woo, CEO of AI Election Solutions, in a balanced manner.

Heo Tae-jung's declaration of 'Chungcheong Joint Great Transformation' was crystallized when Democratic Party candidates for provincial governors in Chungcheong held a joint press conference in Sejong. Eight tasks for mutual prosperity and development were presented, including completion of the administrative capital, establishment of a metropolitan transportation network, and ultra-wide-area cooperation based on Chungcheong Metropolitan Alliance. A vision was unveiled to unite Daejeon's science and technology research and development, Sejong's administrative functions, South Chungcheong's manufacturing, ports, and industry, and North Chungcheong's biotech, semiconductors, and secondary batteries into a single metropolitan economic zone. However, we must first examine how this grand vision will actually operate in the policy field and what obstacles await.

The most fundamental problem with the Chungcheong megacity plan is 'administrative structural heterogeneity.' While Daejeon, South Chungcheong, and North Chungcheong are general metropolitan autonomous entities, Sejong has a separate independent status as a Special Autonomous City. This is not merely a difference in administrative classification, but means that the negotiating table with the central government, budget allocation structure, and policy decision-making authority are all different. In reality, Sejong City, as the administrative capital, has a structure for direct cooperation with the President's Office and government ministries, making it difficult to maintain horizontal relationships with Daejeon, a general metropolitan city.

Historically, wide-area cooperation has been attempted for decades under names like 'Gangnam-Gangbuk cooperation' and 'Southeast megacity.' However, most of these remained at the level of explicit agreements, blocked by differing interests and political positions, and repeated patterns where individual local governments reverted to self-interest prioritization at the stage of actual project implementation. For example, within Chungcheong, there is a high possibility of clashes between Daejeon and South Chungcheong over the direction of industry development, the priority of transportation network connections, and budget allocation ratios. In particular, the implicit competition over 'who will be the center of the megacity' is not explicitly discussed but can create obstacles throughout policy implementation.

In fact, looking at examples of wide-area cooperation that Heo Tae-jung attempted during his previous tenure as mayor, the time gap between official announcements and actual business implementation was considerable. The megacity vision requires more than a 4-year term, and is extremely vulnerable to external variables such as policy shifts by the central government, changes in administration, and restructuring of relevant ministries. Therefore, for this vision to become 'implementable policy,' it must go far beyond simple declarative vision and establish very specific legal foundations, budget acquisition plans, step-by-step implementation roadmaps, and dispute resolution mechanisms beforehand. The concern is that such detailed structures have not been sufficiently disclosed at the current level of presentation.

Another key pledge by Heo Tae-jung is 'developing Daejeon as an AI economic capital.' It is true that Daejeon has science and technology infrastructure including KAIST, the Daedeok Research and Development Special Zone, and government-funded research institutes. However, 'the existence of science and technology infrastructure' and 'the ability to transform it into economic added value' are entirely different matters.

For decades, Daejeon has received considerable central government subsidies and policy attention with the identity of 'science city.' Nevertheless, experts generally assess that research achievements in the Daedeok Special Zone have not circulated sufficiently into the local economy and job creation. The causes are generally as follows: (1) the distance between research institutions and local industries is far, (2) startup ecosystem development is insufficient compared to science and technology hubs like Seoul and Pangyo, (3) continuous outflow of university graduates and researchers to the capital region, (4) insufficient venture capital and early-stage investment, (5) high dependence on central government research funding, resulting in weak self-sustaining economic circulation in the region.

For the AI economic capital pledge to be realized, it must go beyond the level of 'attracting AI industries.' Multi-layered tasks such as commercialization of Daedeok Special Zone research achievements, fostering a startup ecosystem, attracting talent, securing venture capital, and building networks with surrounding industrial complexes must proceed simultaneously. However, it is realistically difficult for all of this to be institutionalized and produce concrete results within a mayor's 4-year term. Additionally, the AI industry itself is a rapidly changing field, and government policy alone cannot force private enterprise choices. For Heo's pledge to not remain a 'declarative vision,' medium to long-term financial investment plans, industry-academia cooperation governance, and national project linkage must be designed very specifically, but such policy documents have not yet been disclosed.

Heo Tae-jung's number one pledge, 'Ontong Daejeon 2.0,' is a plan to redesign local currency not simply as consumption support but as a 'local circulation economy platform.' The idea is to integrate policy allowances such as youth support funds, transportation refunds, and carbon reduction incentives through Ontong Daejeon, and connect the consumption data generated in this process to commercial district activation. While theoretically very attractive, there are several obstacles to real-world application.

First, there is the 'usage rate' issue with local currency. No matter how many benefits are offered, if citizens do not actually use that currency, data will not accumulate. Until now, most local currencies have shown a pattern of high initial interest but sharp declining usage over time. Particularly now that online shopping and credit card payments are commonplace, it is becoming increasingly difficult to change citizen behavior with local currency incentives alone.

Second, there is the 'causal inference' problem in data-based policy making. The consumption data that Ontong Daejeon 2.0 will collect only shows 'how much consumption occurs in which commercial district,' but cannot directly explain 'why that commercial district has not been activated' or 'what intervention is truly effective.' For example, if consumption in a certain alley commercial district is low, data alone cannot reveal whether the real cause is 'rent increases,' 'difficulty in generational succession of aging merchants,' 'parking shortages,' or 'declining foot traffic.' Therefore, between data collection and policy connection, there must necessarily be qualitative stages such as 'on-site investigation,' 'expert opinion,' and 'gathering views from merchants and citizens,' and costs and time increase significantly through this process.

Third, there is the 'external competition' problem of local circular economy. No matter what rewards are offered through Ontong Daejeon, if citizens can shop more cheaply and conveniently through internet shopping or metropolitan area mega-marts, local economic circulation is fundamentally limited. Ontong Daejeon 2.0 can only strengthen 'circulation within Daejeon,' not prevent 'consumption outflow to outside.' Therefore, the actual economic ripple effect of this policy is easily exaggerated.

Heo Tae-jung's integrated care pledge envisions connecting fragmented welfare from childbirth to old age into one system. Theoretically, this is an excellent pledge that could greatly improve citizens' quality of life. However, reality is more complex.

First, current welfare services are handled by multiple actors—the central government, metropolitan autonomous entities, basic municipal governments, and private institutions—and each has overlapping or conflicting legal bases, budget sources, and jurisdictions. For example, long-term care insurance for the elderly is handled by the National Health Insurance Service, basic livelihood security by municipal and county offices, elderly employment projects by the Korea Senior Employment Development Institute, and elderly welfare facilities are operated by a mix of local governments and private entities. For a mayor to 'integrate' all of these requires tasks that are impossible within an individual mayor's authority: legal amendments, negotiations with the central government, and budget adjustments. Therefore, in reality, it is likely to be limited only to 'coordination of projects within Daejeon's jurisdiction.'

Second, there is the 'personal information protection' issue in welfare data integration. To gather all of a citizen's life-cycle data (childbirth records, income, illness, family relationships, housing, etc.) into a single platform requires meeting very high standards in the Personal Information Protection Act, information security, and ethical guidelines. With consecutive government data breach incidents in recent years, citizens' concerns about personal information integration have grown even higher. Therefore, integrated care must be realized at the level of a 'service guidance and linkage system' rather than 'complete data integration.'

Third, there is the 'demand prediction' limitation of one-stop services. To 'identify in advance' who needs what help requires a very sophisticated predictive algorithm. However, welfare needs include many individual circumstances and hidden difficulties that are difficult to fully understand through data alone. Furthermore, when 'help needed' is detected, whether the target actually wants government intervention is a separate issue. Therefore, AI-based recommendations ultimately have to go through human judgment and verification stages, which leads to increased administrative costs.

Among Heo Tae-jung's administrative reform pledges, items like 'one-stop civil complaint resolution system,' 'civil complaint automatic classification AI,' and 'inter-departmental responsibility-passing prevention system' appear very reasonable. However, one cannot overlook the possibility that the introduction of such systems will face resistance within City Hall's internal organization.

First, it conflicts with existing civil servants' work methods. If the existing system of manually classifying and distributing civil complaints changes to 'AI automatic classification,' the roles of the relevant staff are diminished. This can be perceived not simply as 'efficiency improvement' but as a 'job threat.' Especially since civil servants have job security, even if the system implementation doesn't lead to actual layoffs, workplace dissatisfaction and non-cooperation can increase.

Second, there is the trust issue with 'AI judgment' itself. When citizens receive civil complaint classification from AI, how can they verify that the result is fair and accurate? When complaint denial or incorrect classification occurs, who bears responsibility? AI-based administration places great importance on transparency and accountability traceability, but such institutional preparations are not yet sufficiently in place in Korea's current administrative system.

Third, there are the initial costs and friction of introducing new systems. Transforming the entire City Hall civil complaint system to AI-based operation requires substantial initial investment, and during the initial implementation period of several months to a year, confusion and duplicate costs arise from running both the old and new systems in parallel. Additionally, the AI model must be 'retrained' with Daejeon-specific civil complaint data, and this process may take longer than expected.

The biggest weakness of the Chungcheong megacity vision is 'political variables.' Even if Heo Tae-jung wins the mayoral race and Democratic Party candidates in other Chungcheong regions are also elected, the political landscape could change in the next election (2030). If opposition parties win in some areas of Chungcheong, the momentum for wide-area cooperation could drop sharply.

The central government's policy direction is also important. Currently, the Chungcheong megacity vision is being pursued centered on the Democratic Party, but if political power changes in the future, the priority of this policy could be significantly lowered. Wide-area cooperation generally needs to be a medium-term policy lasting 3+ years to show effects, but this may not align with the political reality of local election cycles (4 years) and presidential election cycles (5 years).

A common weakness shared by all of Heo Tae-jung's pledges is 'unclear implementation responsibility.' For example, which organization will operate Ontong Daejeon 2.0? Is it the City Hall's e-Government Department, a newly established separate public corporation, or a cooperation organization with local commercial district groups? Who will lead the 'economic-related departments' to push forward the AI economic capital? Currently, the pledges have not been made specific about the status, scale, budget, and role of implementing organizations.

This is not a mere 'administrative detail.' If the organization is unclear, policy can be shaken when the Daejeon mayor changes, projects can be suspended when personnel moves, and budget allocation processes can lower priority ranking. There are indeed past cases where many local government pledges were stranded due to 'organizational gaps.'

For the Chungcheong megacity to go beyond simple 'vision declaration' to actual cooperation, legal foundation is essential. Currently, Korea's Local Autonomy Act and wide-area cooperation related laws lack a clear legal framework that allows 'four autonomous entities to operate as an integrated economic zone.' Cooperation between metropolitan entities mostly relies on 'agreements' and 'voluntarism,' which can be shaken whenever political changes or budget issues arise.

Furthermore, data sharing and integrated system operation involve multiple regulations including the Personal Information Protection Act and Information and Communications Network Act. To share consumption data from 'Ontong Daejeon 2.0' or resident health information from 'integrated care' across the entire Chungcheong region, not only legal agreements between local governments but also regulatory relaxation at the central government level or new legal foundations are necessary, but these prerequisites are not currently specified.

Interestingly, the conservative camp has also attempted similar-scale wide-area cooperation in the past. The 'Southeast megacity' during the Park Geun-hye administration and the 'Korean Peninsula New Economic Plan' during the Lee Myung-bak administration are examples, and they all ended at the declaration level or were scaled down to partial infrastructure projects. Concerns about the current Chungcheong megacity vision arise for similar reasons—there are not many examples in Korean politics where 'large-scale wide-area policies' were consistently pursued for 4 years or longer.

Particularly, we must also consider 'power struggles' between local governments. Dividing roles with Daejeon as 'economic capital,' Sejong as 'administrative center,' and South Chungcheong as 'industrial base' is a good plan, but conflicts of interest from each region are unavoidable when actually distributing budgets and authority. If the Sejong mayor or South Chungcheong governor is elected from the current conservative camp, the momentum for this wide-area cooperation will inevitably weaken considerably.

| Pledge Content | Ideal Outcome | Realistic Obstacles | Difficulty Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ontong Daejeon 2.0 (Local Circular Economy) | Local currency usage rate over 50%, small business sales increase of 20% | Low citizen participation, data regulations, excessive initial operating costs | High |
| AI Economic Capital | Attract 300+ AI-related companies within 5 years, create 5,000+ new jobs | Intense competition with capital region AI clusters, talent outflow, insufficient R&D investment | High |
| Integrated Care System | Unified care for elderly, disabled, and children, 30% reduction in administrative costs | Inter-departmental administrative barriers, legal limits on personal information sharing, initial system construction challenges | High |
| Chungcheong Wide-Area Cooperation Framework | Policy synchronization across 4 regions, implementation of joint medium-term policies | Political variables, election cycle mismatches, conflicting interests across regions | High |

Q1: Are you evaluating that there is a high possibility of failure in Heo Tae-jung's pledges simply due to a 'critical stance,' or is there objective evidence?

A: There is objective evidence. First, there are very few examples among domestic local governments that consistently pursued wide-area policies of similar scale for 4+ years. Second, related legal and institutional support is lacking. Third, other local government pledges from similar periods (e.g., Busan megacity) also failed to meet initial expectations. Therefore, this is not 'criticism' but 'realistic evaluation based on historical data.'

Q2: Then what are the 'minimum conditions' necessary for this pledge to succeed?

A: There are three minimum conditions. First, within 100 days of winning the pledge, 'establishment of implementing organization and completion of organizational law amendments' must be completed. Second, 'legal agreements' must be signed with other local governments in Chungcheong, and these agreements must include 'clauses to be maintained even with political change.' Third, 'explicit support promises' must be obtained from the central government (Office of the Prime Minister, relevant ministries). Currently, it is unclear whether all three conditions have been met.

Q3: Is there not a possibility that the AI economic capital pledge could be dismissed as an 'exaggerated promise'?

A: The possibility is high. The term 'AI economic capital' itself already carries elements of exaggeration. Whether Daejeon can truly have the status of a 'capital' when competing with capital region AI hubs like Gangnam and Pangyo is a separate question. A more realistic pledge would be around 'AI-supporting industry hub city' or 'AI talent development hub.' The current level of pledge expression risks raising voter expectations excessively.

Q4: If all these pledges fail, what will be the concrete damage that Daejeon citizens will suffer?

A: The biggest damage will be 'loss of credibility.' If large pledges fail, citizen political participation in the next mayoral election may decline. Second is 'wasted initial investment costs.' Cleanup of failed projects, organization dissolution, and system discontinuation also require substantial budgets. Third is 'opportunity cost.' Focusing on these pledges may cause other pressing issues (urban deterioration, job shortage, educational disparity) to be pushed aside.

Daejeon Mayoral Candidate Heo Tae-jung's pledges certainly show ambition and traces of serious consideration of Chungcheong's future. However, as shown through this analysis, good vision and realistic implementation capacity are different matters. The four axes of pledges—Ontong Daejeon 2.0, AI economic capital, integrated care, and wide-area cooperation—all require 'long-term policies of 10+ years' to show effects, but a local government mayor's term is 4 years. Unless this fundamental time structure mismatch is resolved, even the best pledges inevitably fall into a pattern of '2 years of implementation → partial outcomes → inertial operation from year 3 onward → handoff to next mayor after 4 years.'

Therefore, the question I want to ask voters is this: 'Can this pledge truly extend beyond 4 years and continue through the next mayor's term?' 'Within the current administrative system and political structure, is this possible?' If the candidate can answer these questions clearly, and those answers are grounded in concrete implementation plans and legal foundations, then that is when a pledge can be said to be worthy of voter trust.

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